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promoting more open immigration policies in rich Western countries that 
benefi t from the resource trade. This reform would acknowledge the more 
short-term considerations of concrete individuals that are owed duties of 
justice. Furthermore, it would sidestep direct intervention in the internal 
affairs of countries that severely violate human rights.
Many of the possible worries to these policies are raised and addressed in 
the book: worries about measures or standards proposed (293); interference 
in internal affairs of regimes (294–295); compatibility with WTO rules (297), 
some negative effects on countries banned from trade and on worst-off in 
both export and import countries (298–300); readiness of people for change 
(300–302); effects on energy supplies for importing countries; climate change 
(302–305), and others. Beyond Blood Oil: Philosophy, Policy and The Future, 
published in 2018 presents some additional criticism and answers provided 
by Wenar. Even with these issues taken into account, this book is a great 
contribution to the fi eld of international resource trade. It systemises con-
siderable body of literature and gives detailed analysis of the current praxis, 
with special consideration given to the contextualising of and to historical 
perspective on the issues. Wenar’s writing is clear, revealing and accessible 
both to professionals and general public. His moral argument is compelling, 
inviting, and is built on widely shared values. More just international trade 
system is not merely an ideal, but the goal we should strive for and work on, 
as Wenar is doing—not just by his careful and precise writing, but also by 
other more practical activities he engages in.
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In the book entitled A Critical Overview of Biological Functions, Justin Gar-
son provides an accessible overview of the functions debate and delineates 
three canonical theories in the debate—the selected effects theory, the fi t-
ness-contribution theory and the causal role theory—and their specifi c ram-
ifi cations, such as the goal-contribution theory and the “weak” etiological 
theory. In this critical overview, Garson also includes his preferred theory 
termed the generalized selected effects theory.
In the fi rst chapter, entitled “What Is a Theory of Function Supposed 
to Do?”, Garson emphasizes the important role that the notion of function 
plays in biology, philosophy, medicine, psychiatry, and ecology. An impor-
tant philosophical task is to develop a theory which will best accommodate 
the notion of function in each of those disciplines. In line with this task, 
the author spells out three desiderata that every theory of biological func-
tion should satisfy. These desiderata are as follows: fi rst, a theory should 
be able to distinguish a function of a trait from its accidental byproducts. 
For instance, “the function of my nose is to help me to breathe, but not to 
hold up my glasses, despite the fact that it does both and both are good for 
me, the latter is just a lucky accident.” (4). Second, it should accommodate 
the explanatory dimension, i.e., “when we attribute a function to a trait, we 
purport to explain why the trait is there, that is, why organisms possess the 
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trait” (4). Third, the normative dimension of functional statements, that is, 
the logical possibility for a trait token to have a function that it cannot, in 
fact, perform (5). According to these desiderata, Garson evaluates promi-
nent theories of biological functions.
In the second chapter, entitled “Goals and Functions”, Garson starts with 
a historical overview of debates on the notions of purposefulness and goal-
directedness related to the functioning of cybernetic machines in the 1920s 
and 1930s. He proceeds to the contemporary philosophical debates regarding 
biological functions that have started in the 1970s. In this chapter Garson 
provides an informative overview of theories preceding modern conceptual-
izations of biological functions, and lays out the foundation for following ap-
proaches, namely the selected effects theory, causal role theory, etc.
In the third chapter, entitled “Function and Selection”, Garson exam-
ines selected effects theories. Here, the author shows how “the theory (se-
lected effects) plausibly accounts for the explanatory and normative aspects 
of function” (33, italics added). The theory roughly states that a function of 
a trait is whatever it was selected for by natural selection or some natural 
process of selection. According to Garson, selected effects theory meets all 
three desiderata that the theory of functions should satisfy. Firstly, it can 
distinguish between a function and a lucky accident because a function of a 
trait is based on natural selection, hence it is not a mere accident. Secondly, 
this kind of theory provides an explanatory aspect of function because when 
one attributes a function to a trait, one offers a causal explanation for why 
the trait currently exists. Thirdly, a normative aspect of a function is met 
since a trait can malfunction. In other words, it is possible for the trait not 
to perform its selected or “designed” function.
After laying out the main criticisms of the selected effects theory, Gar-
son concludes this chapter with an exposition of his own preferred selected 
effects theory—the generalized selected effects theory. One of the important 
criticisms of the traditional selected effect views is that they do not apply 
to entities that do not reproduce. The generalized selected effects account 
can accommodate this problem. According to this view, entities can acquire 
functions in virtue of their differential persistence. To illustrate, Garson 
uses an example from neuroscience. He considers the formation of the ma-
ture synaptic structure of the human brain. Garson explains that formation 
of synapses and their pruning (which can be seen as a type of selection) can 
give rise to new functions in the brain even though there is no differential 
replication. According to Garson, the function of a trait consists in the activ-
ity that led to its differential reinforcement or its differential reproduction 
in a biological population. The fi rst part of the defi nition of a generalized 
selected effects theory intends to cover various forms of processes of neural 
selection where there is no replication, and the second part of the defi nition 
covers the traditional part of the selected effects theory—natural selection 
(56–61). The third part of the defi nition, namely the one that refers to bio-
logical population, is meant to exclude some of the counterexamples for a 
selected effects theory (e.g. examples with clay crystals). Garson’s own ver-
sion of selected effects theory nicely addresses diffi culties posed by critics 
towards the selected effects theory. By generalizing the defi nition, he tries 
to capture also the entities that do not reproduce, and by doing that, in a 
way, he advances the selected effect theory.
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In the fourth chapter, entitled “Function and Fitness”, Garson explains 
the fi tness-contribution theory of function. He provides an overview of all 
the relevant theories that construe a function as a “contribution to the fi t-
ness of the organism that possesses it” (67). Some of the infl uential propo-
nents of such a view are Christopher Boorse, Michael Ruse, and John Big-
elow and Robert Pargetter. According to Garson, these theories can clearly 
meet only the fi rst desideratum. We can distinguish between a function and 
an accidental effect since we can see the difference in the contribution of an 
effect on fi tness (e.g. the function of the nose is to help us breathe and not 
hold up glasses because only the former effect is contributing to fi tness, that 
is, it raises one’s probability to survive and reproduce). However, Garson 
proceeds to claim that the second desideratum (the explanatory dimension) 
and the third desideratum (normativity) are not clearly met in the fi tness-
contribution theory of function.
In the fi fth chapter, entitled “Function and Causal Roles”, Garson dis-
cusses the causal role theories of biological functions. Garson explains: “Ac-
cording to this view, roughly, a function of a part of a system consists in 
its contribution to some system-level effect…” (81). The original causal role 
theory was developed by Robert Cummins. Cummins’ causal role theory does 
not include a causal explanation of how a trait came about. For instance, it 
does not provide an explanation for the existence of a heart. Instead, causal 
role theory explains functions in terms of its contribution to a system in 
which it operates. Also, Cummins’ view was further developed by Carl Crav-
er and Paul Sheldon Davies. Their contribution to the development of the 
causal role theory includes utilizing the mechanistic framework to explain 
functions. Garson expounds two major problems for the causal role theory. 
The fi rst problem is that the theory assigns a function to items that are in-
tuitively non-functional. For instance, it is implausible to say that the func-
tion of a heart is to make beating sounds, but, proponents of the causal role 
theory must admit that in some contexts (depending on which effect of a trait 
we are interested in) this can be a function of the heart. The second problem 
is about distinguishing function and dysfunction. In some cases, causal role 
theory can ascribe a function to a trait that is clearly malfunctioning. For 
instance, if we are interested in how myelin degeneration causes paralysis, 
then on the present account, we would be forced to say that in this research 
context, myelin degeneration is functioning normally because it causes the 
effect under investigation (namely, paralysis).
Furthermore, Garson discusses function pluralism, which is motivated 
by the fact that biologists use both selected effects and causal role theories 
to assign functions to items, and, consequently, distinguishes two forms of 
pluralism. Function pluralism gained popularity due to its ability to capture 
different practices of ascribing functions. When biologists assign functions 
to items, in some cases they purport to causally explain why the item is 
there (selected effects theory), while in other cases, they purport to describe 
how the item contributes to a greater system (the causal role theory). Thus, 
according to pluralism, selected effects theory accommodates functions that 
are more prominent in evolutionary sciences (e.g. evolutionary biology) and 
the causal role theory captures functions in disciplines that do not rely on 
evolutionary explanations (e.g. physiology). This more “popular” version of 
pluralism Garson calls the between-discipline pluralism; different theories 
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of function are appropriate for different scientifi c disciplines. Garson also 
provides a new version of pluralism, the within-discipline pluralism. He 
emphasizes that it is possible that in one discipline scientists can use both 
theories in order to ascribe functions. For instance, even though a biologist 
does not explicitly appeal to selection when attributing functions to traits, 
she can do so implicitly. So, different concepts of a function can coexist with-
in the same discipline, hence the name “within-discipline” pluralism.
In the sixth chapter, entitled “Alternative Accounts of Function”, Garson 
expounds contemporary alternatives to classical theories of biological func-
tions. Here Garson explains David Buller’s “weak” etiological account, the 
family of systems-theoretic functions (“organizational view”) and the modal 
theory of functions developed by Bence Nanay. Weak etiological theory de-
fi nes function in terms of inheritance and past contribution of that function 
to fi tness, thus, “a trait token in an organism has a function so long as that 
kind of trait contributed to the fi tness of that organism’s ancestor and it is 
inherited” (97). The family of systems-theoretic theories is “based on the 
idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way that very 
token contributes to a complex, organized, system, and thereby to its own 
continued persistence, as a token.” (97). The modal theory of functions says, 
roughly, that “the function of a trait token has to do with the behavior of 
that token in certain possible worlds.” (97).
In the last chapter, entitled “Conclusion: What Next?”, the author con-
cludes the ideas developed in this book. Garson provides three main conclu-
sions: (1) there are no viable alternatives to the selected effects theory since 
none other theory meets all desiderata; (2) if we accept pluralism it should 
be the “within-discipline” pluralism; and (3) he advocates his specifi c ver-
sion of the selected effects theory—the generalized selected effects theory 
that is explained in the third chapter of the book.
To sum up, Garson’s book provides a profound insight into the function 
debate. Through many informative examples, he illustrates and explains 
all relevant theories regarding biological function. In addition to explain-
ing all three canonical theories and their misgivings, Garson also provides 
his own critical stance on the function debate, namely by introducing the 
generalized selected effects theory. His version of the selected effects theory 
is innovative in so far that it widens the scope of selected effects theory 
and, thus, provides new insights on the traditional debate. Garson’s own 
approach belongs to the family of selected effects theories and, therefore, 
meets all the required desiderata that a biological function theory should 
meet. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that Garson introduces a new 
form of pluralism (the within-discipline pluralism) as a plausible position 
in the discussion about the nature of biological functions. Surely, this book 
provides a great impetus to philosophers and biologists to advance the de-
bate on biological function.
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